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CASE SUMMARIES
Selected Case Summaries - Fall 1993
FIRST AMENDMENT
LAMB'S CHAPEL V. CENTER MORICHES UNION FREE SCHOOL
DISTRICT, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
Lamb's Chapel ("Church"), plaintiff, appealed a Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision which granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendant, Center Moriches Union Free School Dis-
trict ("School"), and rejected the Church's claim that denial of ac-
cess to the school premises in order to exhibit a religiously oriented
film series on family values and child rearing was a violation of the
Church's First Amendment right to free speech. Section 414 of the
New York Education Laws authorizes local school boards to adopt
regulations for use of school property when school is not session.
The School issued regulations which authorized the school to be
used for "social, civic or recreational uses" and for "use by political
organizations which are secured in compliance with §414." The
School expressly prohibited its use by any group for religious pur-
poses. The Church twice applied to the School seeking permission
to show a film series which would discuss the views of a licensed
psychologist concerning the role of traditional, Christian values in
raising a family. After the School twice denied the Church access
to school premises, the Church commenced suit in the District
Court challenging the denials as First Amendment violations.
Held: Denying the Church access to the school premises solely
because the film dealt with subjects from a religious standpoint
was a violation of the First Amendment's free speech clause. To
permit school property to be used for the presentation of views
about family and child rearing except for those presentations deal-
ing with the subject from a religious standpoint made the School
District's denial of the Church's application discriminatory and not
viewpoint neutral. In addition, the Court found that because the
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film would not have been shown during school hours, would not
have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to
the public, permitting the Church to show the film would not con-
stitute an establishment clause violation. Reversed.
S.G.
ANTITRUST
PIAZZA, ET AL. V. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, ET AL., 836 F. Supp.
269 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Major League Baseball ("MLB") moved for an order to certify
for immediate appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit the denial of their motion to dismiss antitrust
claims. On August 4, 1993, the District Court granted in part and
denied in part MLB's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint,
which left many antitrust claims. MLB has proposed the following
questions upon which certification is sought: 1) Is baseball's ex-
emption from antitrust law limited to the reserve clause; and 2) If
not, does the reserve clause encompass relocation and/or ownership
issues?
Held: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), federal law permits im-
mediate appeals of otherwise unappealable orders, such as a mo-
tion to dismiss, only when the district judge believes such an order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substan-
tial ground for difference of opinion (i.e. whether the antitrust ex-
emption extends beyond the reserve clause and that the ownership
and relocation issues constitute the "business of baseball"), and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation. All three factors in
§1292(b) must be met.
The court cited several factors relevant to the determination
of whether certification would materially advance the ultimate ter-
mination of the lawsuit. First, it is likely that the case would be
ready for trial regardless of the disposition of the antitrust claims.
Second, the effect on discovery would be burdensome and unfair to
the plaintiff, and would nonetheless continue even if the antitrust
case need not be tried. Also, any stay of trial could possibly result
in a second appeal which would be a considerable waste of time
and resources. Last, the court specifically discourages piecemeal
appeals, in order to have the entire controversy presented to it at
one time, on a full record from which it can make a final determi-
nation of the issues in the case. Denied.
E.A.W.
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